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The Appeals Court held CEQA was inapplicable in a water emergency
declaration. It explained that CEQA distinguished between ministerial and
discretionary projects. CEQA applies only to discretionary projects for which
the agency must prepare an environmental impact report ("EIR"). The Appeals Court further explained ministerial projects are actions WRD may not
influence when addressing environmental concerns. The Appeals Court specifically held the declaration of a water emergency has no environmental impact and therefore is not a project within the definition of the CEQA. The
Appeals Court also held WRD had no discretion to alter the terms of the
Judgment even if an EIR was prepared. Therefore, even if WRD considered
the environmental effects of declaring a water emergency, an EIR would have
no effect because WRD had no discretion to modify carry over rights or delayed replenishment.
The Appeals Court further held that even if CEQA was applicable, the
Judgment's physical solution trumped the CEQA. The Appeals Court explained that where an existing judgment or decree implementing a constitutional mandate establishes a physical solution, the agency may not act in contravention of the physical solution. Therefore, WRD had no discretionary
authority and only the court had the power to act.
Accordingly, the Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and allowed WRD's declared water emergency to stand.
Akx Bayee Besong

COLORADO
Town of Minturn v. Tucker, 293 P.3d 581 (Colo. 2013) (holding a substantive error existed in a recently-issued decree; the water court retained jurisdiction to correct such substantive errors; the town made a prna facie
showing of the substantive error; and the water court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the substitution of more accurate historic use data).
The Town of Minturn ("Minturn") filed applications in Colorado District
Court for Water Division Number 5 ("water court") for new water rights and
changes to its existing water rights in 2005 and 2007. More than thirty parties
opposed the applications, and Minturn subsequently entered into agreements
with all opponents. Tucker's predecessors in interest were among the opposers, namely, Battle Mountain Corporation, Battle Mountain Limited Liability
Company, and Sensible Housing Company.
Tucker eventually entered into a stipulation with Minturn, which contained provisions stating Tucker would not oppose entry of a proposed decree, provided the decree contained terms and conditions no less restrictive
than those in the stipulation. After the water court entered of the final decree,
Minturn discovered the stipulated decree based several consumptive use calculations on billing statements rather than more accurate calculations, which
made the monthly calculations differ by one month and not reflect of actual
monthly historical use numbers. Minturn petitioned the water court to correct
the decree. Tucker was the only opposer to Minturn's petition to correct the
decree. The water court granted Minturn's petition, and Tucker appealed.
The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo.
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Minturn first argued COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304(10) grants the water
court authority to correct substantive or clerical errors in decrees. The Court
began by analyzing the plain language of the statute and determined it plainly
provided water courts the authority to correct such errors. The Court then
looked to Minturn's petitions to determine whether it alleged facts sufficient to
establish a pnma facie showing of clerical error in the decree. The Court determined Minturn had met this burden, and upon such a showing, the water
court had a duty to admit and consider all relevant testimony to establish the
intent of the parties to the original stipulated decree.
The Court then reviewed the extrinsic evidence the water court had examined and held the water court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
the parties intended to use the actual consumptive use figures, and not the data
provided by the billing company. The language of the stipulation and proposed decree included specific provisions indicating the historic actual use of
the applicant was the figure the parties intended to use at the time they entered
into the stipulation.
The Court then considered whether the water court afforded Tucker a
sufficient opportunity to rebut this evidence. Tucker supplied a supplemental
response and affidavit, but did not provide expert testimony to rebut Minturn's
expert testimony. Because the water court afforded Tucker an opportunity to
provide contrary evidence, the Court held it did not abuse its discretion in
giving more weight to Minturn's expert than to Tucker's own affidavit. In sum,
the Court held Minturn met the requirements of COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92304(10) to petition the water court to correct substantive errors, and the water
court did not abuse its discretion in correcting the errors.
The Court next addressed the "no less restrictive" provision of the stipulation to determine whether that provision precluded the water court from
amending decrees. The stipulation between the parties contained language
stating the opposers would not oppose the entry of a proposed decree as long
as the decree contained terms and conditions that were no less restrictive than
those the parties agreed upon in their stipulation.
Tucker argued any increase in the monthly limitations was per se less restrictive on Minturn, and thus against the intent and plain language of the stipulation. Minturn argued that, while the monthly use totals would be different,
the yearly consumptive use was identical. The Court examined the stipulation
and determined the phrase "no less restrictive" was open to more than one
reasonable interpretation, and therefore was ambiguous. Having found ambiguity in the parties' stipulation, the Court then looked to the facts and circumstances surrounding the stipulation to determine the parties' intent at the time
it was signed. The Court examined the language of all the stipulations in the
case and concluded the intent of the various parties was to use "historical actual use" as the basis of the calculations, and the erroneous figures that had been
incorporated into the decree were contrary to the parties' intent.
The Court next examined whether the corrected decree was indeed no
less restrictive than the terms the parties agreed upon in the stipulation. In
doing so, the Court examined Minturn's actual historic water use, and determined the corrected figures correlated to the historic use, as was the parties'
intent. Furthermore, the Court concluded the water court's assertion that the
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corrections would not injure other vested rights was based on sufficient evidence. While Tucker argued the change would injure his rights, he did not
provide any evidence to support this assertion. However, the Court found that,
if Tucker could proffer evidence of injury, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304(6)
allowed the water court to retain jurisdiction over the adjudication for five
years on the question of injury to his vested rights.
Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
water court to allow substitution of Minturn's corrected historic use figures.

Winslow Taylor

Nat'1 Ski Areas Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 12-cv-00048-WJM,
2012 WL 6618263 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2012) (holding (i) the US Forest Service's 2012 Directive was vacated because it violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and the National Forest Management Act; and (ii) plaintiffs were entitled to remedial and injunctive relief be-

cause of these violations).
National Ski Areas Association, Inc. ("Association") sought a nationwide
injunction from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
("court") to set aside the US Forest Service's ("USFS") March 6, 2012 Directive ("2012 Directive"). The 2012 Directive changed the nature and treatment of ski area water rights on federal land by requiring permit holders to
transfer their water rights to the United States, should the Forest Service decline to reauthorize the ski area's permit. The Association claimed (i) the 2012
Directive exceeded USFS's statutory authority, compelled uncompensated
taking of private property, violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA"); and
(ii) USFS did not provide public notice or opportunity to comment, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the National Forest
Management Act ("NFMA").
USFS first argued the Association did not have standing to pursue its claim

because of the applicability of the harmless error doctrine. USFS contended
the Association did not suffer injury because the agency's failure to follow the
APA procedural requirements amounted to a mere harmless error. Moreover,
USFS argued the informal input opportunities it presented went beyond the
APA requirements. Additionally, USFS claimed Association could not
demonstrate that its procedural injury was not redressable.
The court, however, did not find USFS's arguments convincing. The court
pointed out that the harmless error doctrine was narrow scope and, thus, limited to insignificant errors. Therefore, complex issues or instances of disregard
for important rulemaking procedures were outside the doctrine's scope. Although Association had offered informal opportunities to comment on the
rulemaking, the court held that this was not a sufficient substitute for the formal notice and comment procedures required by the APA. Also, the court
concluded that the normal redressability requirement does not apply in cases
involving enforcement of procedural rights under the APA and NFMA. In
short, the court found that Association satisfied the standing requirements in
the case.
The court next examined the Association's procedural claim under the
APA. USFS argued the rule was merely an interpretive rule because of its na-

